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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
The United States appeals from an order entered by the 
U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, 
denying a motion to reinstate dismissed counts of an 
indictment against the appellee, Raymond Midgley. The 
government had dismissed the counts after Midgley pled 
guilty to one charge of the indictment pursuant to a plea 
agreement. Midgley subsequently made a successful 
collateral attack on his conviction. The district court denied 
reinstatement of the dismissed counts on the grounds that 
the statute of limitations had run. In seeking reversal, the 
government asks us to resolve a conflict among our district 
courts as to whether dismissed counts of an indictment 
may be reinstated under these circumstances. The district 
court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 2255, and we have 
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
Because we find insufficient grounds for withholding 
application of the statute of limitations, we will affirm the 
order of the district court. 
 
I. FACTS 
 
On September 3, 1991, a federal grand jury returned an 
indictment against Raymond Midgley, charging six counts 
of controlled substance and firearms violations. Included in 
the indictment was a charge that Midgley had used or 
carried a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking 
crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 924(c).1 Prior to trial, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. An investigation had revealed that Midgley was involved in drug 
trafficking, and that he carried firearms during drug sales. During 
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Midgley entered into a plea agreement with the government 
in which he agreed to plead guilty to the count of violating 
S 924(c) in exchange for dismissal of the remaining counts 
of the indictment.2 The agreement contained no provision 
for waiver of Midgley's statute of limitations defense as to 
the counts to be dismissed. Midgley entered his guilty plea 
and was sentenced on October 5, 1992, to five years 
imprisonment, the statutory minimum. The government 
dismissed the remaining counts of the indictment on the 
same day. Midgley was incarcerated on October 23, 1992, 
and commenced service of his sentence. 
 
On December 6, 1995, the United States Supreme Court 
held in Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995), that in 
order to establish that a defendant "used" afirearm within 
the meaning of S 924(c), the government must show not 
mere possession, but active employment of the firearm by 
the defendant. On May 23, 1996, some 5 years and 3 
months after commission of his offenses, Midgleyfiled a 
motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 2255 to vacate his sentence 
in light of Bailey. Although the government conceded that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
execution of a search warrant at his residence, a handgun was found 
among drugs and drug paraphernalia. The sixth count of Midgley's 
indictment charged a violation of 18 U.S.C. S 924(c)(1), which provides: 
 
       Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug 
       trafficking crime . . . for which he may be prosecuted in a court 
of 
       the United States, uses or carries a firearm, shall, in addition to 
the 
       punishment provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking 
       crime, be sentenced to imprisonment for five years. . . . 
 
2. Count I charged that Midgley distributed heroin on or about December 
14, 1990, in violation of 21 U.S.C. S 841(a)(1). Count II charged that 
Midgley distributed marijuana on or about February 10, 1991, in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. S 841(a)(1). Count III charged that Midgley 
distributed L.S.D. on or about February 11, 1991, in violation of 21 
U.S.C. S 841(a)(1). Count IV charged that Midgley possessed marijuana 
with the intent to distribute on or about February 11, 1991, in violation 
of 21 U.S.C. S 841(a)(1). Count V charged that Midgley, a previously 
convicted felon, possessed a .38 caliber handgun on or about February 
11, 1991, in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 922(g)(1). Count VI, to which 
Midgley had pled guilty, charged that he violated 18 U.S.C. S 924(c) by 
using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking 
crime on or about February 11, 1991. 
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Bailey required Midgley's sentence to be vacated, it 
requested that the court reinstate the dismissed counts of 
his original indictment. The U.S. District Court for the 
Middle District of Pennsylvania, Kosik, J., granted Midgley's 
S 2255 motion but refused to reinstate the dismissed 
counts. In a Memorandum Opinion dated March 11, 1997, 
No. 96-7494, we affirmed the order but stated that the 
disposition was "without prejudice to whatever rights the 
government may have to pursue in the district court its 
application to reinstate the dismissed counts of Midgley's 
indictment and without prejudice to Midgley's right to raise 
the statute of limitations in opposition to that motion or a 
new indictment." On March 21, 1997, the government filed 
a motion to reinstate the dismissed counts which the 
district court denied on July 31, 1997. The government 
now appeals. 
 
II. DISCUSSION 
 
Our review of a district court's legal determinations and 
its application of legal precepts to facts is plenary. Epstein 
Family Partnership v. KMart Corp., 13 F.3d 762, 766 (3d 
Cir. 1994). 
 
The general federal statute of limitations applies to all 
offenses charged in Midgley's indictment. That statute 
provides: 
 
       Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, no 
       person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for any 
       offense, not capital, unless the indictment is found or 
       the information is instituted within five years next after 
       such offense shall have been committed. 
 
18 U.S.C. S 3282 (1994). On appeal, the government asks 
us to hold that this statute does not prevent reinstatement 
of any or all of the five dismissed counts of the original 
indictment against Midgley, notwithstanding that more 
than five years have elapsed since the commission of the 
underlying offenses. The government argues alternatively 
that (1) the literal terms of the statute do not apply to 
counts which are brought within five years, dismissed, and 
then reinstated; (2) the statute should be tolled under 
principles of contract law and equity because Midgley 
breached the plea agreement; and (3) the statute should be 
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tolled as a matter of policy in order to prevent abuse of the 
plea bargain process. Whether the statute of limitations 
prevents reinstatement of dismissed counts of an 
indictment when the defendant's guilty plea conviction is 
vacated is a question of first impression before this Court. 
 
Two district judges in the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
have addressed this issue prior to the case sub judice, with 
contrary results. In United States v. Gaither, 925 F. Supp. 
50 (M.D. Pa. 1996) (Rambo, C.J.), the defendant, pursuant 
to a written plea agreement, pled guilty in 1990 to violating 
S 924(c). In 1996, after the defendant's conviction was 
vacated under Bailey, the government sought to reinstate a 
dismissed count of the original indictment. Despite 
sympathy for the government's position that the defendant 
would "reap a windfall" by evading the dismissed charge, 
the court maintained that the "overwhelming concern" of 
the policy underlying the statute of limitations was 
protection of the accused. For this reason, the court 
refused to toll the statute. 925 F. Supp. at 53-54. Only 
weeks later, however, in United States v. Viera, 931 F. 
Supp. 1224 (M.D. Pa. 1996) (Caldwell, J.), another judge in 
the same district held on nearly identical facts3 that the 
government could reinstate dismissed charges after 
expiration of the limitation period where the government 
was "not at fault" and "the defendant has upset what the 
government reasonably understood to be a final disposition 
of a criminal matter." 931 F. Supp. at 1230-31. 
 
Much of the analysis in Gaither was embraced by the 
Second Circuit in United States v. Podde, 105 F.3d 813 (2d 
Cir. 1997), vacating United States v. Reguer, 901 F. Supp. 
525 (E.D.N.Y. 1995). In Podde, nearly nine years after the 
alleged misconduct, the defendant's guilty plea conviction 
for structuring financial transactions under 31 U.S.C. 
S 5313 was reversed. The government then sought to 
reinstate dismissed charges of conspiracy and wire fraud. 
Podde, 105 F.3d at 815. In vacating a district court order 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. In Viera, after the defendant's conviction was vacated in light of 
Bailey, the government in 1996 requested reinstatement of two 
dismissed counts based on acts committed in May of 1990. 931 F. Supp. 
at 1226. 
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permitting reinstatement, the Second Circuit rejected 
arguments similar to those offered by the government here 
in favor of the rule that the statute of limitations applies to 
counts of an indictment dismissed pursuant to a plea 
agreement and that the statute is not tolled following 
vitiation of the agreement merely because the government 
"acts diligently and without fault." Id. at 819. 
 
A. Applicability of the Statute of Limitations 
 
Section 3282 itself does not indicate whether the 
limitation period applies to reinstated counts of an 
indictment which was originally "found" within five years. 
The government maintains that a district court may simply 
vacate the order dismissing the original indictment, at 
which point "the indictment becomes pending as though it 
had never been dismissed." In this posture, the statute of 
limitations would be inapplicable on its face, and the result 
that follows would comport with the policy objectives 
behind the statute. We disagree with both contentions. 
 
A statute of limitations "limit[s] exposure to criminal 
prosecution to a certain fixed period of time following the 
occurrence of " criminal acts. Toussie v. United States, 397 
U.S. 112, 114 (1970). Limitations are "designed to protect 
individuals from having to defend themselves against 
charges when the basic facts may have become obscured by 
the passage of time and to minimize the danger of official 
punishment because of acts in the far-distant past." Id. at 
114-15. "Limitations statutes . . . are intended to foreclose 
the potential for inaccuracy and unfairness that stale 
evidence and dull memories may occasion in an unduly 
delayed trial." United States v. Levine, 658 F.2d 113, 127 
(3d Cir. 1981) (emphasis in original). 
 
In order to adhere to this mandate and still determine 
that a dismissed indictment is "found" within the meaning 
of S 3282, it would be necessary to conclude that a 
defendant could never be prejudiced in his defense by the 
delay in prosecution that occurs between the times of 
dismissal and reinstatement. Yet this proposition is 
inherently unsound, because any statute of limitations 
incorporates an "irrebuttable presumption" that, beyond 
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the period of limitation, "a defendant's right to a fair trial 
would be prejudiced." United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 
307, 322 (1971). Absent a statute of limitations, an 
indefinite suspension of prosecution impairs a defendant's 
constitutional rights and prolongs the defendant's "anxiety 
and concern" over the pending charges. See Klopfer v. North 
Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222 (1966) (holding State's nolle 
prosequi procedure to be an unconstitutional violation of 
right to speedy trial where statute of limitations was tolled 
during pendency). 
 
Other circuit courts faced with this issue have held that 
the terms of S 3282 do apply to dismissed counts of an 
indictment which was brought within the limitation period. 
Podde, 105 F.3d at 818 (holding that "the statute of 
limitations begins to run again once an indictment is 
dismissed"); United States v. Davis, 487 F.2d 112, 118 (5th 
Cir. 1973) (applying Klopfer, and holding that dismissal of 
criminal charges "does not impair the protection afforded 
by the statute of limitations," which is a defendant's 
"primary protection" against prosecutorial delay). We agree 
that, for purposes of S 3282, counts of an indictment do not 
survive a dismissal. We therefore reject the government's 
position that the statute does not apply to reinstatement of 
dismissed counts. 
 
This conclusion is particularly compelling when we 
examine the policy goals served by a statute of limitations. 
The government argues that reinstatement of the dismissed 
counts would be faithful to the policy concerns underlying 
the statute because (1) the initial indictment against 
Midgley fulfilled the objective of providing notice to the 
defendant, (2) no concerns of prosecutorial unfairness or 
dilatory conduct are implicated, and (3) any remaining 
concerns involving protection of the defendant do not apply 
where the defendant "created the problem."4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Bailey was decided in December of 1995, approximately three months 
prior to the expiration of the limitation period applicable to Midgley's 
dismissed counts. The government suggests that it is no coincidence that 
Midgley delayed filing his S 2255 petition until May of 1996, three 
months after the limitation period had run. We express no opinion as to 
whether Midgley's delay "created the problem" here. 
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The government is correct that giving notice to the 
defendant and discouraging prosecutorial delay are both 
important policies served by a statute of limitations. We do 
not disagree that those goals would still be fulfilled were 
reinstatement of the dismissed charges permitted here. Yet 
in terms of policy, our primary focus must be upon the 
defendant. While the Supreme Court stated in Toussie that 
"several considerations" formed the policy basis of a statute 
of limitations, it explained first that the limitation protects 
the accused "from having to defend themselves against 
charges when the basic facts may have become obscured by 
the passage of time," and added that the time limit "may 
also have the salutary effect of encouraging law 
enforcement officials promptly to investigate suspected 
criminal activity." Toussie, 397 U.S. at 114-15 (internal 
quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
 
Following Toussie, the Court instructed us in Marion that 
 
       the applicable statute of limitations is the primary 
       guarantee against bringing overly stale criminal 
       charges. Such statutes represent legislative 
       assessments of relative interests of the State and the 
       defendant in administering justice; they are made for 
       the repose of society and the protection of those who 
       may during the limitation have lost their means of 
       defence. 
 
Marion, 404 U.S. at 322 (internal quotations, citations, 
brackets, ellipses and footnotes omitted). 
 
In evaluating Toussie and Marion, the Second Circuit 
concluded that the statute of limitations "exists primarily to 
protect the rights of the defendant," and the fact that a 
defendant's guilty plea conviction was later vacated by a 
Supreme Court decision "in no way affects the fact that his 
defense to the original charges may have been jeopardized 
by the passage of time." 105 F.3d at 819-20. We agree that 
the primary purpose of the statute of limitations is to 
protect the ability of the accused to present an effective 
defense to the charges against him. Consequently, applying 
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the terms of S 3282 to dismissed counts of an indictment 
best fulfills that objective.5 
 
B. Tolling 
 
The government next argues that, even if the statute of 
limitations applies to reinstated counts, the statute should 
be tolled because Midgley breached his plea bargain 
agreement. In exchange for Midgley's guilty plea to one 
charge, the United States dismissed the five other charges 
it now seeks to reinstate. According to the government, by 
successfully moving to vacate his guilty plea conviction, 
Midgley has "revoked his acceptance" of the plea agreement 
and the government should be free to withdraw its part of 
the bargain. See United States v. Reguer, 901 F. Supp. 525, 
529 (E.D.N.Y. 1995), vacated, United States v. Podde, 105 
F.3d 813 (2d Cir. 1997). The government thus seeks an 
equitable restoration of the parties to the status quo ante by 
a tolling of the statute of limitations from the time of the 
dismissal order. 
 
We have observed that criminal statutes of limitations are 
subject to tolling, suspension, and waiver. United States v. 
Levine, 658 F.2d 113, 119-121 (3d Cir. 1981). Equitable 
tolling of a statute of limitations may apply where a 
complaint succeeds a filing deadline through either the 
complainant's benign mistake or an adversary's 
misconduct. Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 
U.S. 89, 96 (1990). "[E]quitable tolling may be appropriate 
if (1) the defendant has actively misled the plaintiff, (2) if 
the plaintiff has "in some extraordinary way" been 
prevented from asserting his rights, or (3) if the plaintiff has 
timely asserted his rights mistakenly in the wrong forum." 
Kocian v. Getty Refining & Marketing Co., 707 F.2d 748, 
753 (3d Cir. 1983) (citations omitted). Although the doctrine 
of equitable tolling is most typically applied to limitation 
periods on civil actions, see Irwin, 498 U.S. at 95, "there is 
no reason to distinguish between the rights protected by 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Because we hold that the dismissed counts may not be reinstated, we 
need not reach the issue of whether facts admitted to by Midgley in his 
guilty plea to Count VI might constitute admissions as to elements of 
these other offenses. 
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criminal and civil statutes of limitations." Powers v. 
Southland Corp., 4 F.3d 223, 233 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 
Federal courts invoke the doctrine of equitable tolling 
"only sparingly," and will not toll a statute because of "what 
is at best a garden variety claim of excusable neglect" on 
the part of the defendant. Irwin, 498 U.S. at 96. Absent a 
showing of intentional inducement or trickery by the 
defendant, a statute of limitations should be tolled only in 
the "rare situation where equitable tolling is demanded by 
sound legal principles as well as the interests of justice." 
Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 96 F.3d 1246, 1251 (9th 
Cir. 1996) (tolling two-year limitation period for actions 
against the U.S. under the Federal Tort Claims Act where 
the plaintiff, a foreign national, had been incarcerated in 
the U.S. for over two years); Lewis v. United States, 985 F. 
Supp. 654, 657 (S.D. W. Va. 1997) (finding circumstances 
"sufficiently extraordinary" to warrant equitable tolling of 
new one-year statute of limitations for relief under 28 
U.S.C. S 2255 where information charging defendant was 
"negligently and carelessly prepared" and the government 
delayed other remedial action). Thus, the government's 
tolling argument here depends on a finding that Midgley's 
"breach" of the plea agreement, if indeed it can be so 
characterized, prevented the government in an 
"extraordinary way" from exercising its right to prosecute 
him on the dismissed counts. 
 
In our consideration of tolling, we find it unnecessary to 
engage, as other courts have, in an analysis of the 
defendant's conduct under contract principles. See, e.g., 
Podde, 105 F.3d at 820 (finding defendant certainly voided, 
and may well have breached, the plea agreement, yet 
remaining "suspicious of the application of contract law 
doctrine in favor of the prosecution"); United States v. 
Anderson, 514 F.2d 583, 587 (7th Cir. 1975) (finding 
vacated conviction removed "condition precedent" to 
government's agreement not to prosecute on dismissed 
charges); Gaither, 926 F. Supp. at 51-52 (finding 
defendant's successful collateral attack on sentence more 
analogous to a discharge of performance by supervening 
impracticability). A party aggrieved by a breach of contract 
is not entitled per se to relief from a statutory limitation 
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period. Even assuming that Midgley "breached" his 
agreement here, equitable tolling is appropriate only if the 
breach constituted an "extraordinary" interference with the 
government's ability to assert its rights. 
 
Midgley alone did not create the situation of which the 
government complains. Had it not been for the Supreme 
Court's decision in Bailey, he would have had no 
opportunity to "breach" his plea agreement while avoiding 
prosecution on the remaining charges. While the 
government makes much of Midgley's three month delay in 
filing his S 2255 petition, we cannot say that Midgley did 
not simply take advantage of a serendipitous circumstance 
created by others. Although Midgley may in fact have 
frustrated the government's purpose, he did not solely by 
his own design contrive a "rare situation where equitable 
tolling is demanded by sound legal principles." 
 
Moreover, our conclusion here does not depend upon an 
evaluation of the relative equity or good faith exhibited by 
the parties. Congress has the authority to make a"good 
faith" exception to S 3282, yet has declined to do so. See 
Podde, 105 F.3d at 820; Gaither, 926 F. Supp. at 54. While 
the government has pursued its rights here with diligence 
and good faith, it is not entitled to equitable tolling of the 
statute of limitations merely because it is without fault. 
 
C. Potential for Abuse 
 
Lastly, the United States contends that if we fail to create 
an exception to the statute under the circumstances of this 
case, defendants will be encouraged to "sit on their rights 
until the statute has expired on the remaining charges," 
thus encouraging "gamesmanship of a most offensive 
nature."6 Although it stops short of accusing Midgley 
himself of bad faith, the government maintains that Midgley 
"created the statute of limitations problem" here by delaying 
the filing of his S 2255 motion until after the expiration of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The government borrows this phrase from United States ex rel. 
Williams v. McMann, 436 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1970), where it was held that 
reinstatement of an indictment should be permitted during the 
limitations period. 
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the five-year period. The government urges that the inequity 
of Midgley's tactics, compared to its own diligence in 
prosecution, warrants tolling of the statute from at least the 
date of the Bailey decision. While we agree that the 
government has not been at all dilatory and that Midgley 
has in fact upset what the government "reasonably 
understood to be a final disposition of the matter," we 
nonetheless decline to fashion a tolling rule on this basis. 
 
First, as the Podde court observed, the government may 
seek to include a clause in future plea agreements whereby 
the defendant waives the statute of limitations defense as to 
dismissed counts if the defendant withdraws or challenges 
the guilty plea after the limitations period on the original 
charges has expired.7 Podde, 105 F.3d at 821. The 
government may also in the future negotiate a guilty plea to 
more than one count. Moreover, the "potential for abuse" 
complained of here is now substantially reduced because of 
a recent statutory amendment imposing a limitation period 
for petitions brought under 28 U.S.C. S 2255.8 Because a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. See Levine, 658 F.2d at 120-21 ("It is also possible for a defendant 
knowingly and intelligently to waive the statute of limitations, thus 
sanctioning a later indictment which, absent such a waiver, would be 
untimely"); United States v. Meeker, 701 F.2d 685, 688 (7th Cir. 1983) 
("The purposes of a time bar are not offended by a knowing and 
voluntary waiver of the defense by the defendant"). The validity of such 
waivers is not, however, a question before us, and we will not, therefore, 
decide it. 
 
8. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 adds the 
following to 28 U.S.C. S 2255: 
 
       A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to a motion under this 
       section. The limitation period shall run from the latest of -- 
 
       (1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final; 
 
       (2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion created 
       by governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of 
the 
       United States is removed, if the movant was prevented from making 
       a motion by such governmental action; 
 
       (3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized 
by 
       the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the 
       Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on 
       collateral review; or 
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habeas petition must now be filed not later than one year 
after an intervening change in the law, it is only when less 
than one year remains of the limitation period on the 
dismissed counts that a defendant can delay filing until 
after this limitation period has run. 
 
Finally, we must not forget that "criminal limitation 
statutes are to be liberally interpreted in favor of repose." 
Toussie, 397 U.S. at 115 (quoting United States v. Habig, 
390 U.S. 222, 227 (1968)). Section 3282 establishes a fixed 
limitation period with no exception. However tempting it 
may be to create equitable exceptions to bright line rules, 
we must concur with Chief Judge Rambo's observation in 
Gaither that "the very existence of a statute of limitations 
entails the prospect that wrongdoers will benefit," and that 
this reason alone cannot serve as the basis for an exception 
to the statute. Ultimately, the clear and unambiguous rule 
afforded by the criminal statute of limitations is preferable 
to a shifting standard based on the perceived equity of the 
defendant's conduct. While Congress and the courts may 
continue to weigh competing policy interests concerning the 
administration of justice, the unqualified limitation period 
of S 3282 reflects a balance that has already been struck. 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the 
district court denying the government's motion to reinstate 
charges against the appellee. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       (4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims 
       presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due 
       diligence. 
 
Pub. L. No. 104-132, S 105, 110 Stat. 1214, 1220 (codified as amended 
at 28 U.S.C. S 2255) (Apr. 24, 1996) (emphasis added). 
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